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Abstract 
This study analyses the determining factors of reserve errors in publicly listed property and casualty 
insurance companies in the U.S. This subject deserves special attention because the previous 
literature does not control for trade-offs between executive remuneration and other incentives 
regarding such insurers’ discretionary accounting choices. We find that insurance managers 
manipulate loss reserves to increase their stock-based remuneration and to achieve corporate goals 
particularly those goals that relate to reducing tax burdens and obscuring financial weakness. We 
also observe that enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has constrained the loss reserve 
underestimation and changed the structure of reserve error incentives. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings management practices have been extensively investigated with respect to both U.S. firms 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999; and Daniel, Denis and 
Naveen, 2008) and non-U.S. firms (Ali and Hwang, 2000; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000; Ball, 
Robin and Wu, 2003; and Leuz, Nanda and Wysockic, 2003) and with respect to non-financial 
firms (Jones, 1991; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; and Roychowdhury, 2006) and financial 
firms, such as banks and insurance companies (Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen, 1995; Ahmed, 
Takeda, and Thomas, 1999; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; and Grace and Leverty, 2010). In examining 
earnings management motivation, various papers have analyzed whether managers aim to achieve 
either corporate goals (Bartov, 1993; Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Hunt, Moyer and 
Shevlin, 1996; DeFond and Park, 1997; Phillips and Pincus, 2003; and Grace and Leverty 2010) or 
personal benefits (Guidry, Leone and Rock, 1999; Burns and Kedia, 2006; and Baker, Collins and 
Reitenga, 2009). Surprisingly, there are no studies investigating whether managers are able to 
achieve both corporate goals and personal benefits by manipulating earnings.  
Why do managers manipulate loss reserves? Do they aim to achieve personal and/or 
corporate goals? Is there a trade-off between personal and corporate goals? Our paper answers these 
questions by focusing on a large sample of publicly listed property and casualty (P&C) insurance 
companies in the U.S. and has two main findings. First, we show that personal and corporate goals 
may be complementary: insurance managers manipulate loss reserves both to increase their stock-
based remuneration and to achieve corporate goals particularly those goals that relate to reducing 
tax burdens and obscuring financial weakness. Specifically, we find statistically significant 
evidence that stock options, tax benefits and risk benefits predict reserve errors. Our results shed 
light on previous papers (e.g., Eckles et al., 2011) by suggesting that the achievement of corporate 
goals is an intermediate step toward the increase of manager’s compensation through stock options. 
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Second, we find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Acta (SOA), which was enacted on July 30, 2002, has 
reduced loss reserve manipulation practices and altered the structure of reserve error incentives. 
We focus on P&C property and casualty insurance companies because earnings in this 
industry can be easily manipulated through over/underestimation of loss reserves (Smith, 1980; 
Weiss, 1985; Kazenski, Feldhaus, and Schneider, 1992). There is convergent evidence that 
insurance company managers manipulate earnings to smooth net income (Weiss, 1985; Grace, 
1990; Petroni, 1992; and Grace and Leverty, 2011), to minimize taxes (Grace, 1990; Petroni, 1992; 
and Grace and Leverty, 2011), to obscure financial weakness (Petroni, 1992; Harrington and 
Danzon, 1994; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; and Grace and Leverty, 2011), to maximize executive 
compensation (Browne, Ma, and Wang, 2009; Eckles and Halek, 2010; and Eckles et al., 2011) and 
to comply with regulations (Grace and Leverty, 2010 and Eckles et al., 2011). We contribute to this 
stream of the literature because we are the first study to analyze whether there is trade-off between 
managers’ personal (i.e., maximizing management compensation) and corporate goals. Specifically, 
we assess the causality between earnings management and a large set of variables that capture both 
managers’ personal and corporate aims, which is important because pursuing corporate goals 
without controlling for personal goals or vice versa may lead to biased results.  
We also focus on U.S. insurance because the introduction of the SOA in 2002 offers us the 
unique opportunity to study the impact of regulations on earnings management practices in a sector 
in which these practices may be easily (and frequently) undertaken. We show that insurers are less 
inclined to manipulate loss reserves when they are in a state of financial weakness and to maximize 
managers' personal compensation since the enactment of the SOA.  
As such, we build a unique data set from 10-K reports of publicly listed P&C insurers in the 
U.S. from 1995 to 2010. Our sample is representative of the entire U.S. P&C insurance industry; 
                                                          
a The SOA was enacted by U.S. regulators after various corporate and accounting scandals questioned the integrity of public financial 
information, which affected investor confidence (Iliev, 2010). The SOA has established new or enhanced standards for the boards and 
management of all U.S. public companies, in addition to outside accounting firms servicing such companies. The primary features of 
the SOA include individual certification by top management of the accuracy of financial information, tightening of penalties for 
fraudulent financial activity, strengthening the independence of outside auditors who review the accuracy of corporate financial 
statements and a stronger oversight role for boards of directors and audit committees. 
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thus, companies in our sample represents the 50.9% of the overall industry net premiums written in 
2005b. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on loss 
reserve manipulation and discusses research hypotheses. Section 3 contains a description of the 
data. Variables and the methodological approach are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. 
Section 6 presents the empirical results, and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
Earnings management is a common practice in all industries, but empirical methods to assess 
whether and how firms misestimate their income differ substantially among non-financial firms, 
commercial banks, and insurance companies. Earnings management in P&C insurance companies is 
particularly compelling for accounting research for several reasons. First, P&C insurers can easily 
manipulate their income by adjusting the claim loss reserve because such reserves are highly 
dependent on management judgment and their amounts are substantial (much greater than insurers’ 
net income). Second, the detection of loss reserve manipulation is straightforward because publicly 
listed insurers must disclose loss reserve revisions (i.e., reserve errors).  
In a seminal paper, Smith (1980) investigated reserve errors by testing whether insurers 
manage loss reserves to smooth underwriting results and found that reserve errors are not random 
but are caused by specific loss reserve goals set by management. Following Smith (1980), a 
significant literature has tested whether insurers manage loss reserves to achieve the following 
goals: (1) to smooth income, (2) to minimize tax burdens, (3) to obscure financial weakness for 
strategic reasons, (4) to maximize executive compensation, and (5) to comply with regulations.  
In the reminder of this section, we develop our research hypotheses.  
                                                          
b Source of data: U.S. Census Bureau (2012). 
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2.1. Hypothesis 1: the income-smoothing hypothesis 
The income-smoothing hypothesis assumes that accounting data are managed to reduce the 
fluctuations of incomes around a ‘normal’ level (typically, normal income coincides with the 
average historical income). The income-smoothing hypothesis has been investigated in the 
insurance industry by various papers (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson 2003; and Grace and 
Leverty, 2010, and 2011): if profitability is unexpectedly high (low), then the insurer will over-
(under-) estimate its loss reserve to reduce (increase) current income. Various papers have also 
focused on the incentives for income smoothing in the insurance industry (Weiss, 1985; Grace, 
1990; Grace and Leverty, 2010 and 2011). The first explanation is that insurers may aim to stabilize 
reported financial results and absorb economic shocks (Weiss, 1985). An alternative explanation is 
that insurers may have an incentive to select discretionary accounting practices that yield the 
highest rates of return with acceptable levels of earnings variability (Grace, 1990). Finally, insurers 
may also smooth income for purposes of regulatory requirements (Grace and Leverty, 2010 and 
2011). 
Following previous studies, we define the income-smoothing hypothesis tested in this paper 
as follows: Insurers under- (over-) estimate loss reserves when historical income is higher (lower) 
than current income (H1). 
 
2.2. Hypothesis 2: the tax-shield hypothesis 
The tax-shield hypothesis has been proposed by Grace (1990), according to which insurer managers 
have incentives to minimize tax burdens, particularly when the income level is high. Thus, because 
the claim loss provision is tax deductible, insurers—particularly profitable insurers—have an 
incentive to overestimate the loss reserve to reduce their current tax liability.  
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The tax-shield hypothesis has been tested in the insurance industry by various papers (Gaver 
and Paterson, 1999; Nelson, 2000; Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003; Petroni, 1992; and Grace 
and Leverty, 2010, 2011), which have had mixed resultsc.  
Following these studies, we define the tax-shield hypothesis as follows: insurers 
overestimate loss reserves when current income is high (H2). 
 
2.3. Hypothesis 3: the financial-weakness hypothesis 
Various papers (Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; and Grace and Leverty, 2011) support the 
financial-weakness hypothesis, according to which insurers under financial distress are more 
inclined to underestimate the loss reserve compared to other insurers. However, beginning from 
identical results, the explanations for the financial-weakness hypothesis are different. The first 
explanation focuses on the incentives of weak insurers to avoid regulatory intervention (Petroni, 
1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; Grace and Leverty, 2011). The second explanation is that insurers 
with more substantial solvency problems caused by risk-insensitive guaranty funds have an 
incentive to under-report claim liabilities to show increased firm growth (Harrington and Danzon, 
1994).  
Following the previous studies, we define the financial-weakness hypothesis tested in this 
paper as follows: Insurers underestimate their loss reserve when their level of financial weakness is 
high (H3). 
 
2.4. Hypothesis 4: executive-compensation hypothesis 
The executive-compensation hypothesis posits that managers manipulate accounting data to 
maximize their compensation. The effect of executive compensation contracts on accounting 
discretion choices in non-financial firms is one of the most thoroughly investigated areas of 
                                                          
c Grace and Leverty (2011) highlight that the evidence for the incentive to over-reserve for tax purposes depends on how the reserve 
manipulation is defined and the tax incentive is measured. 
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accounting research (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; Gaver, Gaver, and Austin, 
1995; and Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
 Conversely, the executive-compensation hypothesis has been investigated only recently in 
the insurance industry (Browne, Ma, and Wang, 2009; Eckles and Halek, 2010; and Eckles et al., 
2011). These papers find significant relationships between loss reserve manipulation and different 
components of managers’ compensation, including salary, bonus payments, and awards of restricted 
stock and stock options. Moreover, they note that each component of compensation does not 
necessarily induce the same managerial behavior. Thus, managers who can transform positive short-
term results into higher salaries in the following years have an incentive to under-estimate loss 
reserves (Eckles and Halek, 2010). Alternatively, managers with larger proportions of stock options 
and restricted stock awarded are more likely to overestimate loss reserves to shift firm value 
forward in the years to come when this long-term compensation is realized (Eckles and Halek, 2010 
and Eckles et al., 2011). Finally, earnings management incentives created by bonuses are not 
straightforward and other components can induce either over- or under-reserving by managers 
based on their structure (Browne, Ma, and Wang, 2009; and Eckles and Halek, 2010). 
Following previous studies we define the executive-compensation hypothesis as follows: 
Insurers over- (under-) estimate loss reserves to maximize their compensation (H4). Moreover, we 
define the following three related sub-hypotheses: 
Insurers whose managers have substantial performance-based salary arrangements have more 
incentive to under-estimate loss reserves (H4a). 
Insurers whose managers receive significant bonus payments are more likely to over- (under-) 
estimate loss reserves (H4b). 
Insurers whose managers are compensated by significant awards of stock options and restricted 
stock (i.e., stock-based compensation) are more likely to over-estimate loss reserves (H4c). 
 
2.5. Hypothesis 5: the regulation hypothesis 
8 
 
Several studies (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Jones, 1991; and Grace and Leverty, 2010) observe 
that regulation has a substantial influence on earnings management. In view of its importance, it is 
remarkable that only a limited number of papers have analyzed the negative impact of the SOA on 
earnings management (e.g., Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008 and Eckles et al., 2011). Following these 
papers and exploiting the idea that serious shareholder losses arise primarily from inflated earnings 
we define the fifth hypothesis as follows: the SOA plays a role in constraining the loss reserve 
underestimation (H5a). 
In addition, the enactment of the SOA might also have affected insurers' incentives for 
managing loss reserves. For example, Eckles et al. (2011) find weaker relations between reserve 
errors and executive compensation incentives after the enactment of the SOA. In attempting to 
explore such propositions, we define our second regulation-related hypothesis as follows: the SOA 
has changed the incentives under which insurers manage loss reserve (H5b).  
 
3. Data 
Our sample included insurance companies selected according to the following criteria: 1) insurers 
must operate in the P&C sector, and we do not consider life and health insurance companies 
because data for gradual settlement of claims over time (the so-called “run-off triangle”) are not 
available; 2) P&C insurers are listed on a U.S. stock exchange during the 1995-2005 period because 
data for reserve error calculations are not available before 1995 and after 2005; 3) insurers are based 
in the U.S. We must omit non-U.S. listed insurers that do not disclose data related to the run-off 
triangle. Overall, our sample consists of a balanced panel data of 54 insurers from 1995 through 
2010 that represent 50% of the net written premiumsd of the U.S. P&C industry. 
Data are collected from the following sources: 1) information about loss development, 
consolidated balance sheets, consolidated statements of income, and consolidated statements of 
                                                          
d Specifically, insurers in our sample collected 217.6 dollar billion of net written premiums in 2005 (i.e., 50.9% the overall industry 
net written premiums). The data are consistent with the circumstances that the U.S. P&C insurance market is highly concentrated. 
Source of data: U.S. Census Bureau (2012). . 
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cash flow are obtained from applicable 10-K reports; 2) executive compensation data are obtained 
from DEF 14A forms; 3) financial market data are taken from Datastream; and 4) data on the U. S. 
P&C industry are collected from U.S. Census Bureau. 
Definitions of variables are summarized in Table 1. 
 
< INSERT TABLE 1 > 
 
 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for insurer-specific variables, reserve error measures, 
and loss reserve manipulation incentives. The average value of total assets is nearly $25 billion, and 
the average value of net written premiums is approximately $2.8 billion (Panel A of Table 2). 
Similar to the prior literature (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003; Gaver and Paterson, 
2004; and Grace and Leverty, 2011), we find that the average insurer overestimates reserves.  
 
< INSERT TABLE 2 > 
 
Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of the reserve error on an annual basis. The data 
reveal the existence of a relationship between the business cycle and the reserve error. The trend of 
the reserve error suggests that insurance companies are less likely to overestimate loss reserves 
during the peaks of the business cycle (2000-2001) and during recessions (2002), i.e., when it is 
difficult to meet expectations on earnings growth rates and when the effects of a crisis begin to 
affect a company's profitability. This evidence appears consistent with the income-smoothing 
hypothesis.  
In the appendix, we present two tables that assess the correlation among variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Specifically, Table A2 reports the Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix 
between independent variables, which shows that multicollinearity among the incentives should not 
be a concern. Table A3 presents the correlations between smoothing indicators and risk measures: 
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we observe that Smooth1 shows a high and significant correlation with the risk measures, whereas 
Smooth2 reveals a significant correlation only with PV (however the coefficient is lower than that of 
Smooth1). 
 
4. Variables 
This section describes the variables we use in our analysis. Specifically, we describe our dependent 
variable (i.e., the reserve error) (Section 4.1), the independent variable (i.e., smooth indicators) 
(Section 4.2), the tax variable (Section 4.3), accounting-based and market-based estimates of 
insurers risk (Section 4.4), the executive compensation variables (Section 4.5), the regulation 
indicator (Section 4.6), and control variables (Section 4.7).  
 
4.1 Reserve error 
Following various papers (e.g., Weiss, 1985; Petroni, 1992; and Grace and Leverty, 2011), we 
measure the reserve error as the difference between the originally reported reserve and the 5-year 
cumulative developed losses as follows:  
jtiti CPLORLRError j ti +−= ,,,        (1) 
 
where i denotes an insurer (i = 1, 2, …, 54), t denotes a time period (t = 1995, 1996,…, 2005), j 
denotes a development time horizon (j = 5), ORLR is the originally reported loss reserve, and CPL 
is the cumulative paid losses after a given later period. Moreover, Error is scaled by total assets to 
reduce problems of heteroskedasticity.  
 
4.2 Smooth indicators 
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The Smoothing incentive has traditionally been and measured (e.g., Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1990; 
Grace and Leverty, 2011) by the average ROA (Return on Assets) over the previous three years 
(Smooth1): 
3
Smooth1
3
1
t
∑
== t
tROA
      (2) 
 However, this measure of income smoothing has certain drawbacks. First, it is not able to 
capture the smoothing effect because it does not compare current profitability with historical 
profitability. Second, we find this measure is highly correlated with insurers' risk indicators, which 
could bias results (see Table A.3). As such, we also measure the smoothing incentive as follows 
(Smooth2): 
 tt
t
ROA
ROA
−=
∑
=
3
Smooth2
3
1
t      (3) 
This measure enables us to reduce the correlation with risk indicators and to better capture 
the smoothing effect alone. Because shareholders typically prefer a stable earnings trend, managers 
may have a strong incentive to underestimate the reserve error when earnings are lower than the 
historical profitability. Conversely, managers would overestimate the error reserve when earnings 
are higher than the average over the previous three years. 
 
4.3 Tax variable 
Following Grace (1990) and Grace and Leverty (2011), we measure the tax indicator (Tax) as 
follows:  
( ) 
TA
ORLRNITax
t
tt
t
+
=
 
    (4) 
where NI is the disclosed Net Income, ORLR is the Originally Reported Loss Reserve (as reported 
in the 10-K reports) and TA is the book value of total assets. This variable expresses the level of 
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taxable income (as a percentage of assets) before the loss reserve is determined. Because 
overestimating the claim costs diminishes current taxable income, the amount of future claim losses 
are added back to taxable income to derive the decision variable. In particular, insurers should over-
report future claim costs as taxable income increases; thus the sign of Tax is expected to be positive.  
 
4.4 Accounting-based and market-based risk indicators 
An insurer has been traditionally defined as “financially distressed” if there is more than one IRIS 
ratio outside the range considered acceptable by the NAIC (Petroni, 1992; Beaver, McNichols and 
Nelson, 2003; Gaver and Paterson, 2004). However, this approach has been criticized (Grace and 
Leverty, 2011) because it is based on a subjective assessment of the “NAIC acceptable range”. 
Thus, we build a unique dataset that includes measures of insurer risk based on accounting 
information (L), and information about financial markets (PV, VaR, and Beta).  
Following various studies (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990; and Carson and Hoyt, 1995 among 
others), we use Leverage (L) (i.e., 1- E/TA, where E/TA is measured as the ratio between the book 
value of total equity and the book value of total assets) because it is one of the simplest and most 
commonly used accounting risk measures. In addition, we use data from the financial markets to 
construct other measures of insurers’ financial weakness, such as total risk, downside risk, and 
systematic risk. First, we calculate total riske as the standard deviation of the insurer’s daily stock 
returns (Rit) for each fiscal year (PV). The daily equity return is measured as the natural logarithmic 
of the ratio of the stock return series, i.e., Rit = ln(Pit/Pit-1), where Pit is the stock price, which is also 
corrected for any capital adjustment, including dividends and stock splits. PV captures the overall 
variability in insurer stock returns and reflects the market’s perceptions about the risks inherent in 
the firm’s assets and liabilities.  
Following various papers (e.g., Hopper, 1996; Johansson et al., 1999; Basak and Shapiro, 
2001; Campbell et al., 2001; Gaivoronski and Pflug, 2004), we also measure the downside risk 
                                                          
e Following, among others, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990), Anderson and Fraser (2000), and Pathan (2009). 
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through the VaR. First, we estimate daily stock returns’ distribution for each fiscal year. Second, we 
rank daily stock returns from highest to lowest. Third, we estimate the VaR as the first value of the 
lowest 5% quantile of the daily returns distribution (i.e., the highest value of the “left tail” of the 
daily returns distribution)f. As shown by Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006), investors demand additional 
compensation for holding stocks with high sensitivities to downside market movements.  
In the final version, we use the Beta - which is measured as the ratio between the VaR of 
insurer’s stock and the VaR of the market indexg - because it is able to capture systematic risk. 
Various papers (e.g., Lang and Stulz, 1992; Denis and Denis, 1995; Opler and Titman, 1994; 
Asquith et al., 1994; Altman 1993, Dichev, 1998; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Campbell, Hilscher, 
and Szilagyi, 2008; Fiordelisi and Marques-Ibanez, 2013) have extensively investigated whether the 
default risk is systematic and have had mixed results. 
 
4.5. Executive compensation variables 
Each component of executive compensation affects management’s behavior differently (Gaver, 
Gaver, and Austin, 1995; Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Eckles and 
Halek, 2010; Eckles et al., 2011). To assess a managers’ use of accounting practices to pursue self-
interest, we analyze the CEO’s compensation by focusing on three componentsh: 1) change in 
salary; 2) bonus payments; and 3) awards of restricted stock and stock options (i.e., stock-based 
components). 
Following Eckles and Halek (2010), we use change in salary (S_Ch), i.e., the ratio between a 
forthcoming change in salary (Syear t+1 - Syear t) and total compensation. Managers who expect an 
increase in salary from year t to year t+1 have an incentive to underestimate the loss reserve 
reported in year t.  
                                                          
f The VaR has a negative value, but we change its sign to compare it to other risk measures. 
g In this study, we use the S&P 500 Index. 
h We do not include long-term incentive plans because insurance managers in our sample receive this type of remuneration in only a 
few cases.  
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Following Eckles et al. (2011), we also use BP, i.e., the ratio between the bonus payments 
and total compensation. Bonus payments can be considered as a way to align the interests of 
managers to the interests of shareholders; however, they can simultaneously encourage a manager 
to manipulate the loss reserve. Specifically, managers might engage in under-reserving to receive 
bonus payments; however, if they have exhausted compensation from bonus plans, they might 
overestimate the loss reserve to shift earnings to the future (Eckles et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
relationship between BP and the reserve error in year t is difficult to predict.  
Contrary to Eckles and Halek (2010) and Eckles et al. (2011), we sum the values of the 
restricted stock and stock options awarded as a percentage of total compensation (St&Opt) because 
both these components are long-term incentives and should affect the loss reserve evaluation in the 
same manner. As such, both stocks awarded and stock options granted may represent a rationale for 
overestimating the loss reserve in year t and improving a firm’s future profitability; by increasing 
both the probability to exercise stock options and the opportunity to sell restricted stock, managers 
may over-estimate the loss reserve. 
 
4.6 Regulation variable 
Various papers (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 2008; Iliev, 2010; Eckles et al., 2011) provide evidence for 
the role of the SOA in constraining earnings management. Accordingly, and to test the impact of the 
SOA on P&C insurers’ reserve errors, we use a dummy (SOA) that assumes the value of 1 for the 
years after the SOA had become effective (i.e., the year 2002 and onward) and 0 otherwise.  
 
4.7 Control variables 
Previous papers have noted that reserve errors may also derive from insurer managers' mistakes 
(i.e., non-discretionary component) related to the difficulty of estimating the loss reserve (e.g., 
Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1989). As such, the incentives for managing the loss reserve cannot be 
accurately isolated without controlling for non-discretionary component. Whereas several studies 
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(e.g., Grace and Leverty, 2010) have tried to capture this component by controlling for a set of 
variables at the firm and macroeconomic level, we use a variable at the industry level that measures 
unexpected motor vehicle accidents over a development time horizon of a loss reserve (UA). This 
variable is calculated as follows: 
   (5) 
 
 
where t denotes a time period (t = 1995, 1996,…, 2005), MA is the number of motor vehicle 
accidents and g represents the growth rate of accidents between t-1 and t-2.  
 Because the automobile business is highly representative of the entire US P&C insurance, 
e.g., in 2005, it represents 43.6% of the overall industry net premiums written, we recognize that 
this variable is able to capture the non-discretionary component at the industry level. 
 Furthermore, we define a set of control variables at the firm level to account for managerial 
ability to exercise discretion over reserves. 
The first control variable is the longtail ratio (LR) because prior research finds that insurers 
underwriting long-tail lines of business have more discretion over their reserves (e.g., Petroni and 
Beasley, 1996; Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson, 2003; Browne, Ma, and Wang, 2009; Grace and 
Leverty, 2011). Following Browne, Ma, and Wang (2009), the long tail ratio is defined as the 
percentage of net written premiums from longtail lines (such as workers’ compensation, medical 
malpractice, general liability, auto liability, etc.) over total net written premiums.  
Our second type of control variable accounts for differences in efficiency. As such, we use a 
combined ratio (CR) - the sum of the loss ratio and the expense ratio - that describes the level of 
efficiency in the extensive claim settlement process. As initially reported by Weiss (1985), when the 
underwriting process shows low efficiency, insurers have an incentive to overestimate the loss 
reserve to increase the level of premiums.  
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5. Methodology 
We specify a linear model to investigate the determining factors of reserve error as found in the 
established empirical literature on loss reserve manipulation (e.g., Beaver, McNichols, and Nelson 
2003; Grace and Leverty, 2010). We estimate the Eq. (6) using OLS, where reserve error is a 
function of various corporate and personal goals, a regulation intensity indicator, and insurer-
specific variables: 
 
tititittititi
titititti
CRLRUAOptStBPChS
RiskTaxSmoothSOAError
,,10,98,7,6,5
,4,3,2,
&_ εββββββ
ββββα
++++++
+++++= 1        (6) 
 
where i denotes an insurer (i = 1, 2, …, 54), Error reports the difference between the originally 
reported reserve and the cumulative developed losses paid after 5 yearsi; SOA is a dummy variable 
accounting for the coming into force of the SOA; Smooth denotes one of the two smoothing 
indicators (Smooth1 and Smooth2); Tax is a variable accounting for tax burden; Risk denotes one of 
the four risk measures (PV, VaR, L or Beta); S_Ch measures the forthcoming change in salary; BP 
takes into account the level of bonus payments; St&Opt is a measure of restricted stock and stock 
options awarded; LR is a measure of longtail business; CR is a measure of efficiency; and ε is the 
random error term. The variable definitions are summarized in Table 1. 
Because SOA could affect the structure of incentives and the reserve error, we add the 
moderating effects of SOA on corporate and personal goals to Eq. (6) as shown in Eq. (7):  
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+++++++
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  (7) 
where the other variables have the same specification as in Eq. (6).  
                                                          
i The reserve errors are scaled by total assets to mitigate the heteroskedasticity issue.  
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We estimate Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) using OLSj. However, we are aware that various problems 
arise in the estimation of such a model. First, the reserve error distribution might be non-normalk. 
Second, the incentives for managing loss reserves may be different across reserve error levels. 
Therefore, following previous studies (e.g., Grace and Leverty, 2010), we also use a multilevel 
quantile regression that allows for full characterization of the conditional distribution of the reserve 
error and can offer a richer description of the heterogeneous relations among incentives and reserve 
error. This approach, which is a generalization of median regression analysis (Koenker and Bassett, 
1978), allows us to derive different parameter estimates for various conditional quantiles of the 
reserve error distribution.  
Thus, the quantile regression model can be written as: 
iii exError ,++= τττ βα with iii xxErrorQuant ττ β=)(    (8) 
where xi is the vector of incentives and control variablesl and βτ is the vector of parameters. 
)( ii xErrorQuantτ denotes the τth conditional quantile of Error given x
m.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
Table 3 reports the results obtained from estimating Eq. (6) with OLS. This table shows eight 
columns because we use two different indicators (i.e., Smooth1 and Smooth2) to test the income-
smoothing hypothesis and include accounting-based (L) and market-based measures (PV, VaR, 
Beta) to test the financial-weakness hypothesisn. 
 Various factors are found to be significant determinants of loss reserve manipulation. 
Beginning from corporate goals, Tax exhibits positive and significant coefficients, which confirms 
                                                          
j These models utilize White's standard errors to effectively address any concerns related to modest departures from normality. 
k Unlike other studies (e.g., Grace and Leverty, 2010), we find a very low skewness for reserve error distribution (see Table 2). 
However, this condition is not sufficient to accept the hypothesis that reserve error is normally distributed. 
l xi may affect other features of the conditional distribution of Y|X in addition to the location (i.e., the mean), and those features may 
be of interest to this study. 
m The τth regression quantile is defined as one of the possible solutions of this problem of minimization (Koencker and Basset, 1978): 
)(min ττ βρ ii
i
xError −∑
, where ρτ(ε) is the check function defined as ρτ(ε)=(τ-1)ε if ε<0 or ρτ(ε)=τε if ε≥0. To solve this problem we use 
the bootstrapping method. The Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) estimator of β is obtained by setting τ=0.10, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.90. 
n The regression Eq. (6) is well fitted and shows an overall R2 that is always higher than the threshold of 35 percent: the goodness of 
fit of the model increases when we replace the traditional smoothing indicator (Smooth1) with our smoothing variable (Smooth2). 
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the prediction that the incentive to overestimate the loss reserve is higher when there is a greater 
potential for tax savings (Grace, 1990; Grace and Leverty, 2011). In addition, both income-
smoothing indicators are negatively and significantly related to reserve error, which suggests that 
insurers manage the loss reserve in an attempt to stabilize earnings (Weiss, 1985; Grace, 1990; 
Browne, Ma, and Wang, 2009; Grace and Leverty, 2011). Considering the goals related to financial 
weakness, all risk measures (i.e., PV, VaR, Beta, and L) have the predicted sign. This indicates that 
financially weak insurers are more likely to underestimate their loss reserves, which is consistent 
with previous studies (Petroni, 1992; Gaver and Paterson, 2004; Grace and Leverty, 2011). 
 Regarding personal goals, we report that managers who derive a large portion of total 
compensation from stocks and options awarded (St&Opt) are more inclined to overestimate the loss 
reserves in an attempt to shift earnings into the future when the restricted stock will be sold and 
stock options exercised. Moreover, we find evidence (albeit not robust evidence) that the other 
compensation components, i.e., bonus and salary change, predict reserve errors. 
As opposed to previous papers that investigate corporate goals without controlling for 
personal goals (among other Grace and Leverty, 2011) or vice versa (e.g., Eckles and Halek, 2010) 
we find that personal and corporate goals complement one another: insurance managers manipulate 
the loss reserve to both maximize their stock option remuneration and to achieve corporate goals, 
particularly incentives that arise from alleviating tax burdens and obscuring financial weakness. Our 
results advance previous papers (e.g., Eckles et al., 2011) by suggesting that the achievement of 
corporate goals is an intermediate step toward increasing managerial compensation through stock 
options. In this way we provide evidence that compensation based on restricted stock awards and 
stock options are effective in aligning shareholder goals with those of managers because they create 
an incentive for managers to maximize the value of their firm’s stock. This result is somewhat 
unexpected: in recent years, awarding stock-based compensation to firms’ managers has been 
criticized (e.g., Denis, Hanouna and Sarin, 2006 and Goldman and Slezak, 2006) for encouraging 
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financial fraud and increasing incentives for managers to pursue short-term goals, which is expected 
to occur at the expense of firm’s long-term performance. 
With reference to the regulation hypothesis, we find that the SOA has played a role in 
reducing the loss reserve underestimation, although our data only include four years in which the  
SOA was in effect. This result has important implications because most stakeholders do not perform 
adequate checks on the accuracy of loss reserve estimates and inadequate reserves (i.e., 
underestimated reserve) can create problems for insurers long-term financial health.  
 Because the SOA might affect the reasons for managing the loss reserve, we add the 
moderating effects of the SOA on corporate and personal goals as shown in Eq. (7) (Table 4). Thus, 
our model increases its explanatory power even if the effects of various incentives on reserve errors 
remain substantially unchanged. In addition, we find that interactions between SOA and risk 
measures display a positive statistical link with reserve errors, whereas St&Opt*SOA shows a 
negative and significant coefficient. Because the other interactions are not significant, our results 
provide evidence that managers appear less inclined to manipulate the loss reserve when they are in 
a state of financial weakness and to maximize their personal goals after enactment of the SOA.  
 Therefore, a second notable result of this study is that we extend the research of Eckles et al. 
(2011) that finds weaker relations between reserve errors and executive compensation incentives 
after enactment of the SOA. 
 Finally, our results are robust while controlling for a non-discretionary component (i.e., UA) 
and for managerial ability to exercise discretion over loss reserves (i.e., LR and CR). 
 Following Grace and Leverty (2010), we also use a quantile regression to provide an 
effective method of describing how the incentives for managing loss reserves may change across 
different levels of reserve errors (i.e., corporate and personal goals do not have a uniform effect on 
reserve errors).  
 As shown in Tables 5 and 6, the results appear consistent with those of the OLS regressions; 
however, there are certain differences across the percentiles of the distribution that offer crucial 
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additional information. Beginning with Tax, its coefficient is statistically significant in all 
percentiles, but Wald tests show that OLS overestimates the impact of tax incentives at the lower 
tail and underestimates it at the upper tail of the distribution. This evidence is not surprising because 
insurers that underestimate loss reserves should not be driven by tax incentives.  
 Also with reference to Risk (e.g., PV), the conditional distribution provides certain 
interesting snapshots of the relationship between the reserve error and the financial weakness 
indicator. In particular, Risk exhibits a coefficient that is almost always significant but more 
pronounced in the lower tails (see for example Columns 2, and 3 in Table 6), as confirmed by the 
Wald tests. However, this evidence is consistent with the financial weakness hypothesis, i.e., 
weaker insurers (in the lower tails of conditional distribution) are more inclined to underestimate 
the loss reserve compared to other insurers (in the upper tails of the same distribution). Personal 
goals - particularly those captured by St&Opt - seem to produce the greatest effect on the central 
quantiles than on other quantiles. This might indicate that personal goals play a role in managing 
loss reserves particularly when the incentives related to corporate goals (i.e., those captured by Tax 
and Risk) produce a moderated impact. Finally, with reference to interactions, the quantile 
regression seems to confirm that the enactment of the SOA affected the reasons why insurers 
manage loss reserves (see, for example, Column 3 of Table 6 with reference to the interaction 
between Risk and SOA).   
 Therefore, a third notable result of this study is that we support the results of Grace and 
Leverty (2011) by observing that the incentives for managing the loss reserve are different across 
reserve error levels. 
 
Robustness checks 
To further confirm the findings of the OLS and quantile regressions, we perform a number of 
robustness checks. First, because we find that reserve errors are positively serially correlated (which 
is consistent with previous studies, such as Beaver and McNichols, 1998 and Grace and Leverty, 
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2010) we also estimate OLS with one, two, and three lagged values of the dependent variable in an 
attempt to account for the autoregressive process in the data regarding the behavior of reserve error. 
The unreported results obtained are similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4.  
 Second, to address the possible simultaneity endogeneity issues (e.g., reserve estimations 
influence both Return on Asset (ROA) (related to the income-smoothing and executive-
compensation variables) and to net income (related to the tax variable), we use OLS with one 
lagged value of the regressors with potential endogeneity problems (i.e., Tax, Smoothing indicators 
and BP). Once again, the unreported results of these regressions are qualitatively similar to the 
reported OLS results (Tables 3 and 4). 
 
7. Conclusions 
This study analyses the determinants of insurers' reserve errors for a sample of U.S. listed P&C 
insurance companies between 1995 and 2005. Whereas there is extensive literature that focuses on 
various factors that affect insurers' loss reserve manipulation, there are no papers that analyze 
whether there are trade-offs between managerial (personal) and corporate goals. Therefore, we use 
OLS models to investigate the reserve error as a linear function of various corporate and personal 
goals, a regulation intensity indicator, insurer-specific variables, and multilevel quantile regressions 
to analyze how the incentives for managing loss reserves may change across different reserve error 
levels.  
 We find that personal and corporate goals complement one another: insurance managers 
manipulate the loss reserve both to maximize their stock option remuneration and to achieve 
corporate goals, particularly with respect to alleviating tax burdens and obscuring financial 
weakness. In so doing, we provide evidence that stock-based compensation is an effective 
instrument to align shareholder goals with those of managers. 
 Finally, we find that the enactment of the SOA has reduced the inclination of firms to 
underestimate loss reserves and changed the structure of reserve error incentives; in particular, 
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insurers appear less inclined after enactment of the SOA to manage their loss reserves when they 
are in a state of financial distress to pursue personal goals. These results bring added value to 
previous research (e.g., Eckles et al., 2001) that simply observes weaker relationships between 
reserve error and various executive compensation incentives after the enactment of the SOA.  
Our results are resilient to robustness tests performed to check for autoregressive and 
endogeneity concerns. 
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Table 1- Description of variables 
 
 
 
a Source of data: 10-K reports 
b Source of data: Datastream 
c Source of data: Def 14_A reports 
d Source of data: U.S, Census Bureau 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Variables Symbol Description 
Reserve error Error Difference between the originally reported reservea and the 5-year cumulative developed lossesa 
Traditional smoothing indicator Smooth 1 Average ROA over the previous three yearsa 
New smoothing indicator  Smooth 2 The average ROA over the previous three yearsa minus ROA for the current year  
Tax indicator Tax Sum of disclosed net income and estimated error reserve divided by total assetsa 
Leverage L 1 minus the ratio between book value of total equity and book value of total assetsa 
Price volatility PV Standard deviation of insurer’s daily stock returns (Rit) for each fiscal yearb 
VaR VaR First value of the lowest 5% quantile of the daily returns distributionb 
BetaVaR Beta VaR of insurer’s stock divided by VaR of the market indexb 
Change in Salary S_Ch Forthcoming change in salary (Syear t+1 - Syear t)  divided by total compensationc 
Bonus payments BP Bonus payments divided total compensationc 
Stock and stock options awarded St&Opt Sum of the values of restricted stock and stock options awarded, divided by total compensationc 
Unexpected accidents UA Difference between the sum of motor vehicle accidents between t+1 and t+5 and the sum of expected motor vehicle 
accidents between t+1 and t+5 estimated on the basis of the accidents growth rate between t-1 and t-2d 
Longtail ratio LR Net written premiums from longtail lines divided by total net written premiumsa 
Combined ratio CR Sum of the loss ratio (loss divided by gross written premiums) and the expense ratio (expenses divided by gross written 
premiums)a 
SOA SOA SOA assumes the value of 0 for the years before the coming into force of the SOA (Sarbanes-Oxley Act 30 July 2002) 
   
30 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample companies 
 
This table presents the distribution of variables by showing mean, standard deviation, minimum, median, skewness, kurtosis and the number of observations. TA is the total asset 
at fiscal year-end (billions of dollar). LR is the weight of premiums written in longtail business as percentage of total premiums written. CR is the sum of loss ratio and expense 
ratio calculated on GAAP basis. Error is the difference between the originally reported reserve and the cumulative developed losses paid after five years. Smooth 1 is the previous 
three year’s average ROA. Smooth 2 is the difference between the previous three year’s average ROA and the ROA for the current fiscal year. Tax is the ratio between the sum of 
net income and the estimated reserve and total asset. Risk is the annualized standard deviation of the daily stock returns. S_ch is the ratio between the forthcoming change in 
salary and the total compensation. BP is the amount of bonus as percentage of total compensation. St&Opt is the sum of stock awarded value and option granted value as 
percentage of total compensation.  
 
 
Variables:  Mean  
Standard 
deviation  Minimun   Median   Maximum    Skewness   Kurtosis   
 
Observation  
Panel A: Insurer-specific variables: 
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
TA (billion) 24.7  80.2  0.025  2.41  853  6.4829  54.1502  543  
CR 95.1902  26.049  0  100  172.6  -2.5263  10.5304  592  
LR 0.5748  0.3772  0  0.6719  1  -0.3763  1.6194  592  
Panel B: Dependent variable: 
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
Error 0.0605  0.0739  -0.2779  0.0493  0.3297  -0.0059  4.7759  529  
Panel C: Loss reserve manipulation incentives 
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
Smooth 1 0.0326  0.0311  -0.0863  0.0294  0.2034  0.78854  7.1479  412  
Smooth 2 0.0090  0.0453  -0.2166  0.0086  0.1799  -0.4432  5.8385  482  
Tax 0.2983  0.1441  0.0089  0.2911  0.8882  0.4114  3.2401  540  
Risk 0.0097  0.0061  0.0035  0.0085  0.0856  5.7661  61.9904  425  
S_Ch 0.0191  0.1698  -0.5973  0.0069  3.0950  13.9914  254.4932  428  
BP 0.1927  0.1726  0  0.1635  0.7652  0.6844  2.6585  478  
St&Opt 0.2985  0.2814  0  0.2614  1  0.4322  1.9071  479  
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Table 3.  Results from OLS Regression (Eq. (6)) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
SOA 0.0121* 0.0126* 0.0154* 0.0101* 0.0157** 0.0158** 0.0176*** 0.0121** 
 (1.73) (1.78) (2.20) (1.54) (2.45) (2.47) (2.71) (2.01) 
         
Smooth1 -0.2766** -0.2674** -0.2629** -0.3314**     
 (-2.17) (-2.08) (-2.01) (-2.42)     
         
Smooth2     -0.1814** -0.1816** -0.1964** -0.1293 
     (-2.02) (-2.01) (-2.14) (-1.55) 
         
Tax 0.2251*** 0.2259*** 0.2268*** 0.2295*** 0.2354*** 0.2360*** 0.2370*** 0.2479*** 
 (9.07) (9.02) (8.93) (9.83) (10.15) (10.18) (10.10) (11.27) 
         
PV -1.3329*    -1.3198*    
 (-1.72)    (-1.79)    
         
VaR  -0.7830*    -0.7991*   
  (-1.66)    (-1.78)   
         
Beta   -0.0058*    -0.0051*  
   (-1.95)    (-1.90)  
         
L    -0.0487*    0.0123 
    (-1.79)    (0.57) 
         
S_Ch -0.0284 -0.0299 -0.0289 0.0043 -0.0500 -0.0494 -0.0461 0.0060 
 (-0.73) (-0.75) (-0.73) (0.42) (-1.41) (-1.39) (-1.32) (0.52) 
         
BP 0.0379 0.0385 0.0390 0.0408* 0.0326 0.0340 0.0367 0.0356* 
 (1.58) (1.60) (1.62) (1.98) (1.34) (1.40) (1.49) (1.68) 
         
St&Opt 0.0293** 0.0292** 0.0290** 0.0299*** 0.0341*** 0.0344*** 0.0349*** 0.0311*** 
 (2.44) (2.42) (2.40) (2.61) (2.99) (3.01) (3.00) (2.99) 
         
UA 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001** 
 (1.67) (1.73) (2.48) (2.26) (1.58) (1.66) (2.37) (2.19) 
         
LR 0.0195** 0.0193** 0.0188** 0.0240*** 0.0227*** 0.0229*** 0.0225*** 0.0293*** 
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 (2.28) (2.25) (2.18) (2.94) (2.65) (2.66) (2.61) (3.90) 
         
CR -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 
 (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.50) (-1.09) (1.27) (1.31) (1.21) (0.64) 
         
Intercept 0.0097 0.0079 0.0100 0.0254 -0.0609** -0.0642** -0.0647*** -0.0759*** 
 (0.35) (0.28) (0.36) (0.77) (-2.33) (-2.52) (-2.61) (-2.94) 
N. obs. 289 289 289 337 327 327 327 383 
Adj R2 0.3622 0.3579 0.3548 0.3635 0.3934 0.3902 0.3848 0.3841 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Results from OLS Regression (Eq. (7)) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
SOA 0.0021 0.0058 0.0102 -0.0185 0.0133 0.0185 0.0310 0.0671* 
 (0.09) (0.24) (0.42) (-0.34) (0.61) (0.87) (1.42) (1.67) 
         
Smooth1 -0.2992* -0.3143* -0.3138* -0.4835**     
 (-1.84) (-1.87) (-1.86) (-2.45)     
         
Smooth2     -0.1159 -0.1400 -0.2027* -0.1689 
     (-1.08) (-1.29) (-1.85) (-1.61) 
         
Tax 0.2202*** 0.2225*** 0.2259*** 0.2316*** 0.2351*** 0.2354*** 0.2406*** 0.2575*** 
 (7.04) (7.04) (7.02) (7.43) (8.60) (8.59) (8.57) (9.51) 
         
PV -3.8239***    -3.7918***    
 (-3.02)    (-3.54)    
         
VaR  -2.2219***    -2.1783***   
  (-2.77)    (-3.33)   
         
Beta   -0.0179**    -0.0132***  
   (-2.58)    (-2.63)  
         
L    -0.0619*    0.0260 
    (-1.91)    (0.95) 
         
S_Ch -0.0230 -0.0273 -0.0281 0.0033 -0.0264 -0.0310 -0.0339 0.0079 
 (-0.62) (-0.73) (-0.73) (0.30) (-0.67) (-0.78) (-0.85) (0.63) 
         
BP 0.0733** 0.0730** 0.0744** 0.0635** 0.0536 0.0552 0.0622* 0.0534* 
 (2.08) (2.02) (2.06) (2.02) (1.52) (1.55) (1.74) (1.66) 
         
St&Opt 0.0437*** 0.0430*** 0.0434*** 0.0433*** 0.0495*** 0.0495*** 0.0499*** 0.0433*** 
 (2.79) (2.75) (2.77) (2.94) (3.42) (3.43) (3.33) (3.16) 
         
UA 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** 
 (2.10) (2.17) (2.65) (2.35) (1.90) (2.04) (2.58) (2.37) 
         
LR 0.0212** 0.0213** 0.0207** 0.0262*** 0.0219** 0.0228*** 0.0227** 0.0299*** 
 (2.52) (2.53) (2.44) (3.28) (2.53) (2.64) (2.60) (4.00) 
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CR -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
 (-0.56) (-0.79) (-1.00) (-1.12) (1.25) (1.48) (1.39) (0.68) 
         
Smooth1 * SOA 0.1592 0.1924 0.1880 0.4220     
 (0.66) (0.80) (0.76) (1.58)     
         
Smooth2 * SOA     0.0053 0.0345 0.0955 0.1456 
     (0.03) (0.19) (0.51) (0.87) 
         
Tax * SOA 0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0045 0.0029 -0.0152 -0.0157 -0.0208 -0.0265 
 (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.09) (0.06) (-0.34) (-0.35) (-0.45) (-0.63) 
         
PV * SOA 3.1621**    3.1960***    
 (2.24)    (2.65)    
         
VaR * SOA  -1.8651**    -1.8336**   
  (-2.07)    (-2.49)   
         
Beta * SOA   0.0150*    0.0103*  
   (1.96)    (1.79)  
         
L * SOA    0.0494    -0.0351 
    (0.81)    (-0.80) 
         
S_Ch * SOA -0.0094 -0.0024 -0.0007 0.0128 -0.0269 -0.0207 -0.0152 -0.0139 
 (-0.08) (-0.02) (-0.01) (0.15) (-0.31) (-0.24) (-0.18) (-0.20) 
         
BP * SOA -0.0731 -0.0726 -0.0751 -0.0523 -0.0539 -0.0534 -0.0611 -0.0391 
 (-1.58) (-1.55) (-1.61) (-1.25) (-1.19) (-1.17) (-1.33) (-0.96) 
         
St&Opt * SOA -0.0375 -0.0369 -0.0384* -0.0384* -0.0432** -0.0423** -0.0433** -0.0367* 
 (-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.65) (-1.72) (-2.03) (-1.98) (-2.01) (-1.83) 
         
Intercept 0.0098 0.0089 0.0116 0.0329 -0.0437 -0.0554** -0.0639** -0.0971*** 
 (0.34) (0.31) (0.40) (0.84) (-1.50) (-2.07) (-2.31) (-3.16) 
N. obs. 289 289 289 337 327 327 327 383 
Adj R2 0.3966 0.3880 0.3832 0.3751 0.4279 0.4200 0.4075 0.3944 
 
See Table 1 for variable definitions. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5.  Results from OLS (Eq. (7)) and Quantile Regression (Eq. (8)) 
          OLS Quantile regression (Quantiles)            Wald test F Statistics 
         0.10        0.25     0.50  0.75 0.90  All equal 0.25=0.75 0.10=0.90 
Variable        (1)        (2)         (3)      (4)   (5)  (6)     (7)     (8)   (9) 
SOA 0.0021 -0.0038 -0.0047 0.0107 0.0247 0.0049  0.39 0.79 0.03 
 (0.09) (-0.10) (-0.29) (0.38) (1.02) (0.17)     
Smooth1 -0.2992* -0.3786 -0.3916** -0.0517 -0.0263 -0.0573  0.94 3.58 0.81 
 (-1.84) (-0.86) (-2.22) (-0.31) (-0.15) (-0.25)     
Tax 0.2202*** 0.1500* 0.1732*** 0.2152*** 0.2798*** 0.2850***  3.28* 7.11* 2.86 
 (7.04) (1.87) (3.95) (7.51) (6.78) (5.25)     
Risk -3.8239*** -6.0688** -4.5236*** -3.2732*** -1.8241** -2.3789***  1.22 4.08** 1.20 
 (-3.02) (-2.17) (-3.26) (-3.01) (-2.13) (-2.87)     
S_Ch -0.0230 -0.0038 0.0238 -0.0080 0.0375 -0.0157  0.33 0.02 0.00 
 (-0.62) (-0.05) (0.82) (-0.16) (0.46) (-0.19)     
BP 0.0733** 0.0428 0.0377 0.0821** 0.0825*** 0.0828**  0.34 0.96 0.42 
 (2.08) (0.93) (0.87) (1.98) (3.04) (2.35)     
St&Opt 0.0437*** 0.0492* 0.0362* 0.0555*** 0.0233** 0.0167  1.35 0.26 0.75 
 (2.79) (1.65) (1.65) (4.12) (1.41) (0.91)     
UA 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001  0.45 0.14 0.02 
 (2.10) (0.42) (0.82) (2.65) (1.37) (0.84)     
LR 0.0212** -0.0197** 0.0059 0.0301*** 0.0384*** 0.0442***  4.94*** 7.16* 8.58** 
 (2.52) (-1.18) (0.57) (3.16) (4.25) (3.56)     
CR -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  1.63 0.00 0.19 
 (-0.56) (-0.32) (0.83) (-0.39) (0.88) (0.46)     
Smooth1 * SOA 0.1592 -0.5235 -0.1495 0.01054 0.0332 0.2134  0.45 0.32 1.25 
 (0.66) (-0.86) (-0.42) (0.47) (0.17) (0.75)     
Tax * SOA 0.0010 -0.0001 0.0298 0.0593 0.0045 0.0432  0.45 0.10 0.21 
 (0.02) (-0.00) (0.44) (1.26) (0.09) (0.62)     
Risk * SOA 3.1621** 2.9528 2.2734 3.0776* 1.1947 1.5072  0.27 0.26 0.16 
 (2.24) (0.96) (1.20) (1.82) (1.00) (1.12)     
S_Ch * SOA -0.0094 0.0334 -0.0654 -0.2909* -0.1946 0.0299  1.49 0.46 0.04 
 (-0.08) (0.23) (-0.38) (-1.78) (-1.05) (-0.19)     
BP * SOA -0.0731 -0.0201 -0.0351 -0.0996** -0.1004** -0.1100***  0.45 1.01 0.80 
 (-1.58) (-0.32) (-0.49) (-2.01) (-2.29) (-2.90)     
St&Opt * SOA -0.0375 -0.0310 -0.0199 -0.0435** -0.0214 -0.0188  0.61 0.00 0.07 
 (-1.60) (-0.60) (-0.95) (-2.15) (-0.82) (-0.75)     
Intercept 0.0098 0.0402 -0.0118 -0.0183 -0.0468 -0.0147  1.29 0.46 0.39 
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 (0.034) (0.58) (-0.32) (-0.58) (-1.49) (-0.46)     
N. obs. 289 289 289 289 289 289     
R2 0.3966 0.1321 0.1730 0.2994 0.3656 0.4183     
           
 
Risk is standard deviation of insurer’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Superscripts *, **, ***  
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6.  Results from OLS (Eq. (7)) and Quantile Regression (Eq. (8)) 
 
          OLS Quantile regression (Quantiles)            Wald test F Statistics 
         0.10        0.25     0.50  0.75 0.90  All equal 0.25=0.75 0.10=0.90 
Variable        (1)        (2)         (3)      (4)   (5)  (6)     (7)     (8)   (9) 
SOA 0.0133 -0.0184 -0.0341 0.0060 0.0247 0.0133  1.29 4.43* 0.77 
 (0.61) (-0.48) (-0.94) (0.15) (0.99) (0.44)     
Smooth2 -0.1159 -0.0948 -0.1227 -0.1385 -0.0621 0.0676  0.46 0.14 0.49 
 (-1.08) (-0.56) (-0.77) (-0.75) (-0.34) (0.38)     
Tax 0.2351*** 0.0914 0.1689*** 0.2202*** 0.3013*** 0.3432***  5.71*** 9.70*** 7.64*** 
 (8.60) (1.32) (4.28) (10.63) (12.41) (5.35)     
Risk -3.7918*** -7.0040** -5.8102*** -2.5251 -2.1001* -2.4875*  1.66 5.33** 1.77 
 (-3.54) (-2.57) (-2.86) (-1.49) (-1.66) (-1.69)     
S_Ch -0.0264 0.0494 0.0267 -0.0521 0.0281 0.0460  0.39 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.67) (0.57) (0.52) (-0.77) (0.45) (0.44)     
BP 0.0536 -0.0276 0.0177 0.0930* 0.0975*** 0.0412  2.43* 5.25** 1.52 
 (1.52) (-0.57) (0.39) (1.81) (3.42) (1.07)     
St&Opt 0.0495*** 0.0441 0.0335 0.0525*** 0.0368** 0.0290  0.67 0.02 0.19 
 (3.42) (1.38) (1.36) (3.21) (2.32) (1.41)     
UA 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001  1.89 0.39 0.02 
 (1.90) (0.34) (1.73) (1.65) (1.90) (0.22)     
LR 0.0219** 0.0003 0.0146 0.0290*** 0.0309*** 0.0460***  1.46 2.38 4.55** 
 (2.53) (0.02) (1.46) (2.61) (4.07) (3.25)     
CR 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001  1.54 1.05 0.46 
 (1.25) (0.90) (1.70) (0.41) (1.16) (0.11)     
Smooth2 * SOA 0.0053 0.0482 0.2693 0.1932 0.1142 -0.1558  0.88 0.46 0.21 
 (0.03) (0.14) (1.09) (0.91) (0.65) (-0.66)     
Tax * SOA -0.0152 -0.0169 -0.0019 0.0666 0.0037 -0.0255  0.77 0.01 0.01 
 (-0.34) (-0.19) (-0.04) (1.46) (0.09) (-0.37)     
Risk * SOA 3.1960** 4.4825 5.7354** 2.3583 1.5495 1.4907  2.10 5.66** 0.57 
 (2.65) (1.36) (2.28) (0.98) (1.02) (0.90)     
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S_Ch * SOA -0.0269 -0.0251 -0.0173 -0.1529 -0.1414 -0.0649  0.43 0.99 0.05 
 (-0.31) (-0.18) (-0.11) (-1.22) (-1.17) (-0.66)     
BP * SOA -0.0539 0.0124 0.0238 -0.0865 -0.0984** -0.0646*  1.09 3.07 0.72 
 (-1.19) (0.13) (0.32) (-1.19) (-2.50) (-1.87)     
St&Opt * SOA -0.0432** -0.0294 -0.0047 -0.0306 -0.0289 -0.0284  0.46 0.57 0.00 
 (-2.03) (-0.63) (-0.14) (-0.88) (-1.13) (-0.79)     
Intercept -0.0437 -0.0050 -0.0550 -0.0442 -0.0538* -0.0113  1.74 0.00 0.02 
 (-1.50) (-0.14) (-1.07) (-1.09) (-1.73) (-0.24)     
N. obs 327 327 327 327 327 327     
R2 0.4279 0.1276 0.1809 0.3156 0.3906 0.4533     
           
Risk is standard deviation of insurer’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year. See Table 1 for other variable definitions. Superscripts *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics of Error by year 
Year Mean Std. Dev. First quartile Median Third quartile p-value 
mean 
1995 0.0920 0.0754 0.0285 0.1001 0.1454 0.0000 
1996 0.0925 0.0859 0.0241 0.0747 0.1494 0.0000 
1997 0.0795 0.0787 0.0171 0.0666 0.1299 0.0000 
1998 0.0643 0.0735 0.0119 0.0485 0.0989 0.0000 
1999 0.0438 0.0717 0.0055 0.0347 0.0956 0.0001 
2000 0.0269 0.0672 -0.0060 0.0175 0.0578 0.0048 
2001 0.0278 0.0654 0.0053 0.0219 0.0567 0.0032 
2002 0.0369 0.0597 0.0098 0.0391 0.0671 0.0000 
2003 0.0595 0.0625 0.0228 0.0599 0.1059 0.0000 
2004 0.0782 0.0693 0.0333 0.0868 0.1221 0.0000 
2005 0.0897 0.0690 0.0412 0.0935 0.1354 0.0000 
1995-2005 0.0605 0.0739 0.0129 0.0493 0.1056 0.0000 
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Table A2. Correlation matrix between independent variables 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 SOA 1.0000           
2 Smooth1 -0.2865 1.0000          
3 Smooth2 -0.1105 0.1271 1.0000         
4 Tax -0.0948 -0.0068 -0.1364 1.0000        
5 Risk -0.0539 -0.2731 0.1209 -0.0303 1.0000       
6 S_Ch -0.0069 -0.0425 -0.0134 0.0575 -0.0543 1.0000      
7 BP 0.2102 -0.0497 -0.2738 0.0259 -0.2403 -0.0090 1.0000     
8 St&Opt -0.0604 -0.0806 -0.0319 -0.0602 -0.1207 -0.0329 -0.2427 1.0000    
9 UA -0.3626 0.1231 -0.0523 0.0402 -0.1750 -0.0055 0.0038 -0.0260 1.000   
10 LR 0.1399 -0.1596 0.1080 0.2309 0.0361 0.0503 0.1060 -0.0060 -0.0183 1.0000  
11 CR -0.1172 -0.2863 0.4965 0.0162 0.1787 -0.0109 -0.2704 -0.0535 -0.0566 0.3569 1.000 
The table shows Pearson pairs-wise correlation matrix. Bold texts indicate statistically significant at 1% level or better. Risk is standard  
deviation of insurer’s daily stock returns for each fiscal year See Table 1 for other variable definitions. 
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Table A.3. Correlation matrix among smoothing indicators and risk measures 
 Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Smooth1 1.000      
2 Smooth2 0.1271 1.000     
3 L -0.6123 0.1677 1.000    
4 PV -0.2731 0.1209 0.0772 1.000   
5 VaR -0.2788 0.1317 0.0683 0.9705 1.000  
6 Beta -0.3095 -0.0544 0.0165 0.6989 0.7485 1.000 
The table shows Pearson pairs-wise correlation matrix. Bold texts indicate statistically significant at 1% level or better. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
